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Abstract 
This paper uses a network dynamics model to explain the formation of a small-world network 
with an elite-clique. This network is a small-world network with an elite-clique at its center in which 
elites are also the centers of many small groups. These leaders also act as bridges between different 
small groups. Network dynamics are an important research topic due to their ability to explain the 
evolution of network structures. In this paper, a Chinese Venture Capital (VC) network was coded 
from joint investments between VC firms and then analyzed to uncover its network properties and 
factors that influence its evolution. We first built a random graph model to control for factors such 
as network scale, network growth, investment frequency and syndication tendency. Then we added 
a partner-selection mechanism and used two theories to analyze the formation of network structure: 
relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness. After that, we ran simulations and compared 
the three models with the actual Chinese VC network. To do this we computed the elite-clique’s EI 
index, degree distribution, clustering coefficient distribution and motifs. Results show that adding 
embeddedness theories significantly improved the network dynamic model’s predictive power, and 
help us uncover the mechanisms that affect the formation of a small-world industrial network with 
an elite-clique at its center. 
Keywords: Venture capital industry, Network dynamics, Embeddedness, Syndication network 
Introduction 
In this paper, we build a partner-selection mechanism into an industrial network model, and fit 
it to the Chinese Venture Capital (VC) industry. In the Chinese VC industry there are major players 
(known as ‘leaders’ or ‘elites’ in this paper) that lead a group of smaller companies (known as 
‘followers’ or ‘satellites’ in this paper) to form small groups with center-satellites structure. 
These major companies also act as bridges, by connecting to other small groups. In other words, the 
VC network is a special type of small-world (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), in which the central roles of 
small groups are also bridges between these groups. We use the term center-satellites group to refer 
to small, comparatively isolated “caves” (a term indicates isolated groups) in a small-world network. 
This paper will use this term to specify a leader that is surrounded by a small group of followers. 
Major players frequently cooperate with each other, and through their cooperation they form an 
elite-network (Useem, 1984) which is at the center of the whole industry. For this reason, we call 
these major players industry “elites”.  
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This paper will present a partner-selection mechanism that integrates embeddedness theory to 
show the formation of a small-world network with an elite-clique at its center. These elites are the 
centers of their respective center-satellites groups and also act as bridges to other small groups. In 
an industry of this type, a major firm often initiates a business plan and then chooses followers to 
join in the plan. For example, in a VC investment plan, there is always a major investor who assesses 
an investment opportunity, is responsible for setting up the plan, and organizes the syndication 
partners. There may be one seat in an investee’s board for investors, and in general, this major player 
will represent investors by being on the board. This paper incorporates the selection mechanism 
stated above into the model, and illustrates significant structural results of this selection mechanism 
in the dynamics of the industry network. 
Modeling networks serves at least two purposes. Firstly, it helps us understand how networks 
form and evolve, e.g., in terms of community evolution, changes in network statistics, and 
emergence of central roles, etc. Secondly, in studying simulations of network-dependent social 
processes, successful network models can be used to specify the structure of interaction, such as 
link prediction (Tylenda, Angelova, & Bedathur, 2009) and community detection (Nguyen, Dinh, 
Tokala, & Thai, 2011). A large variety of models have appeared in the physics-oriented network 
literature in recent years. Some models focused on understanding the structure and evolution of 
these large-scale networks (Barabási et al., 2002; Garlaschelli & Loffredo, 2005; Rosenkopf & 
Padula, 2008), while other models shed light on the high level of growth and topological 
characteristics of these networks. For example, Viswanath, Mislove, Cha, & Gummadi (2009) 
presented the interaction among users in the Facebook online social network, and they found that a 
minority of the user pairs generate a majority of the activity. The models mentioned above can be 
classified into two main categories: 1) Models where new links may be added depending on the 
local network structure. 2) Models where the probability of establishing or removing a link would 
depend solely on the nodal attributes. 
In this paper, we will present the structure and evolution of a VC network by combining 
properties based on nodal attributes and local network properties. Nodal properties include 
investment frequency and syndication tendency for each node. The partner-selection mechanism 
and embeddedness theory, which includes relational and structural embeddedness (Granovetter, 
2017), are brought in to incorporate network structure into the model. VC firms invest in start-up 
companies that have potential, but lack capital. This involves dealing with certain risks and 
uncertainties. As a way of sharing resources and risks, syndication between VC companies is a 
common investment strategy to get more opportunities and reduce risk. 
We introduce the partner-selection mechanism to help us explore what shapes this network. 
Through this mechanism, we show how a major player in the VC industry selects a partner for an 
investment. This mechanism first incorporates findings from relational embeddedness theory on 
partner selection as well. These findings are primarily about inviting frequent syndication partners 
(VC firms which have multiple joint investments) to jointly invest in a company. Our other model 
then adds structural embeddedness (to relational embeddedness), which broadens the scope of joint 
investments from friends to friends’ friends. In other words, friends of friends are included in the 
syndication network of future investments. Finally, we compare the different models with the 
Random Joint Investment model, in which VC firms randomly choose syndication partners. In the 
models, we control for network size, growth, investment frequency and syndication tendency. These 
are calculated from real data. We also select degree, tie strength and clustering coefficient 
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distribution as macro-level indicators and some motifs as micro-level indicators to compare the 
three models with real network data. Our comparison shows that both the relational and structural 
embeddedness models fit the real network well.  
In the following sections, we will introduce the network features of the Chinese VC industry, 
as well as syndication partner-selection mechanisms, and the relevant literature. After that, our data 
collection process is described. We then build the three network dynamics models. At last, this paper 
will compare the models and simulate the structural embeddedness model to show the formation of 
the industrial network structure.  
 
Theoretical Background 
 The Evolution of a VC Industrial Network 
Syndication among venture capital firms is defined as a joint investment by multiple investors 
in one investee at the same time. Networks are dynamic, new roles are added in and new ties are 
built, while old ties might be maintained or cut off (Ahuja et al., 2011; Beckman, Haunschild, & 
Phillips, 2004; Loftus et al., 2005). A VC firm may build and cut ties for many reasons, including: 
A better network position (Bygrave, 1987); To exercise greater influence on investment partners 
and target newly-emerging companies (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008); To obtain a higher probability of 
survival (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Yang, 2010). Furthermore, this branch of research investigates 
the motivations behind networking behaviors, such as diverse geographical and industrial 
distribution (Kogut, Urso, & Walker, 2007), and multiple connectivity and trend following in the 
bio-tech industry (Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005). 
There is a relative paucity in the corporate finance literature due to the difficulties of analyzing 
syndication patterns empirically and verifying the complex motives behind syndication (Lerner, 
1994). Attachment patterns and the logic behind relationship building might be the key to better 
explaining this field (Hochberg et al., 2010). Especially in the context of emerging countries such 
as China, the difficulties of data collection often impede research. Although Chinese VC firms have 
many things in common with their western counterparts, they also have differences. One difference 
in particular is the institutional and cultural emphasis on guanxi and networking (Burt & Burzynska, 
2017), which can bring about different activities and relation-building logic (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 
2003; Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005).  
The Chinese VC industry is characterized by government intervention and newly established, 
constantly changing institutions. In this kind of high-uncertainty environment, players seek alliances 
to hedge against various types of risks. Building guanxi, defined as “a high-trust relationship which 
is relatively independent of the social structure around it” (Burt & Burzynska, 2017; Burt & Opper, 
2017), is a common strategy for players in this industry. Major players often mobilize their 
reputation and resources to attract loyal followers to form guanxi circles, i.e. ego-centered networks 
with various layers of guanxi, each with different levels of trust and intimacy (Luo et al., 2017). 
These small circles constitute center-satellites groups in a small-world network. In addition to small 
groups, a small-world network has a few bridges that connect otherwise isolated groups, so that the 
cluster coefficients in local networks are very high but the average distance among nodes in a larger 
network is short (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). In the Chinese VC network, a central actor (elite) 
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generally plays the role of a long-distance bridge, while its followers form a dense in-group network 
that rarely connects to outsiders (Luo, Ke, Yang, Guo, & Zou, 2018). Furthermore, these major 
players, or “elites” (Useem, 1984), frequently cooperate with each other, so an elite-clique emerges 
as the network’s center (Lou & Li, 2017). In other words, guanxi makes small groups’ leaders and 
their followers cooperate frequently, and bonds the leaders together to form an elite-clique (Wu, 
Wu, & Rui, 2009). In the following, we will use the term ‘small groups’ to indicate center-
satellites groups, and ‘clique’ to specify the elite-clique. 
Fig. 1 is about here 
We use a network model to explain the evolution of the network structure in this sort of industry. 
This model uses two theories, relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness (Granovetter, 
1985), to analyze network dynamics in the Chinese VC industry. 
Relational embeddedness theory 
Long-term cooperation breeds trust (Gulati & Westphal, 1999), and the expectation for future 
runs of a game ensures that cooperative relations continue (Axelrod & Reisine, 1984; Hardin, 2001). 
Chinese people tend to cooperate with familiar persons by means of long-term favor exchanges 
(Hwang, 1987). This suggests that a Chinese VC will initiate a new joint investment with people 
who have had a cooperative experience with the centered ego (generally the leader or leaders of the 
VC firm) in the past. Frequent cooperation and strong trust often come from combined motivations, 
i.e., motivations that mix instrumental and friendship goals (Granovetter, 2017), which in turn 
promote further syndication. A successful investor always has familiar partners, who form the hard 
core of this person’s ego-centered co-investment network or the centered ego’s guanxi circle (Luo, 
et, al., 2018). Companies who have frequent cooperation, strong trust, and friendship with the 
centered ego are more likely to be chosen in a new run of syndication, so we include this statement 
in the model: Frequent cooperation increases the possibility of participation in a new joint 
investment. 
Structural embeddedness theory 
Simply having strong ties in a dense ego-centered network is not enough to build up a system 
of relationship developing mechanisms. For example, a new run of cooperation may involve a huge 
amount of profit or loss, and this may damage relations between old partners. For the sake of 
maintaining a friendship, the centered ego sometimes avoids inviting familiar partners to join a new 
investment, and instead opts to recruit an indirect tie as a new partner.  
Alternatively, a focal VC firm needs to search for new investment opportunities. A small circle 
of frequent syndication partners cannot provide these opportunities, so it needs new partners to 
broaden its search scope. Embeddedness theory argues that good economic decisions depend on 
whether information comes to you (Granovetter, 2017). Without social relations in the Chinese VC 
industry, it is hard to get enough information to analyze a project. Relation building is thus needed 
to access good projects. In other words, one focal actor needs to take continuous action to build 
relations to access new investment opportunities. Information providers can be weak ties or familiar 
partners. According to structural-hole theory (Burt, 1992), familiar partners form a dense, small-
scale network, while weak ties form a sparse, large-scale network, which tends to be full of non-
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redundant information. In addition, many holes in this sparse network grant the hole-spanning ego 
information and control benefits. The sparse network of occasional syndication ties forms a 
peripheral belt outside the core of a centered ego’s guanxi circle. This belt has two functions: The 
first is to act as a process of trial and error through which unfamiliar partners are tested to see if they 
are suitable for long-term cooperation. The second function is that weak ties in this peripheral belt 
may help introduce indirect ties, who may then be involved in syndication projects. 
To summarize the above, social ties are important as they enable access to valuable projects 
and introduce new partners to a centered ego. However, in such a highly uncertain environment, 
strangers or those with high relational distance are not a good choice to be an investment partner, 
since information asymmetry makes them untrustworthy. So those with a short path to the centered 
ego, such as direct ties and friends of friends are chosen. This leads to an additional function: 
Relational distance is associated with the possibility of joint investment.  
Most Chinese VC firms avoid cooperating with strangers, as contracts and contract law are not 
reliable. Third-party trust (Burt & Knez, 1996) plays an important role in this context. A mediator 
can transfer his or her guanxi to another friend, while a bridge can provide much needed information 
at the right time (Burt, 2000). Without knowing detailed information about a possible new partner, 
a centered ego may find it hard to make a decision. This highlights the second key function of guanxi: 
To introduce new partners to old friends. In other words, common neighbors help introduce possible 
syndication opportunities to potential partners. The more common neighbors two VC firms have, 
the greater the possibility they will become partners. We thus add a third function to our model: The 
number of common neighbors is positively associated with the possibility of joint investment. 
Methodology 
A Small-World Network with an Elite-clique 
In China, major venture capital databases such as China Venture, Zero2IPO and Venture 
Capital Research Institute’s annual reports release data about all public investments. Among them, 
SiMuTon Database, built by research institute Zero2IPO, collects investment data from the internet 
and other sources. It includes the investee’s name, investment date, and investment stage (initial, 
expansion, and seed stage). Based on this widely-used database, we identified syndication ties 
among VCs and built a co-investment network. Fig. 2 shows how this undirected and weighted 
network is formed: A tie is created between two VC firms when they invest in the same target firm 
at the same time. We then collected more investment information from public sources, to 
compensate for any missing network data. In total, our model includes information for 7,640 
investment events and 1,436 nodes (VC firms) and 4,623 edges (co-investment ties among those 
firms) from 2000 to 2013. 
Fig. 2 is about here 
In Fig. 3, we first compute the distance between two VCs. If they are neighbors, then we assign 
them a distance of one. If they have a common neighbor, then the assigned distance is two. If they 
are connected by three steps, then the distance is three, etc. If they made eight joint investments in 
the past, then the distance is 1/8, 7 joint investment is 1/7, etc. The vertical axis indicates the 
probability of syndication in the next period. Fig. 3 shows that firms with a distance of three have 
no chance to cooperate. Also, the probability of syndication increases as the number of past-joint 
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investments between two VCs increases. 
Fig. 3 is about here 
We compute our network structure through several steps. In the first step, this study will find 
the major players (elites) in the VC network. We apply the Graph Attention algorithm (Velickovic 
et al., 2017) to identify these elites. The Graph Attention algorithm uses VC nodes and their first-
order neighbors as its input data. We then use the Adam SGD optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2015), 
which computes the attention coefficient in each pair of nodes. The attention coefficient indicates a 
node’s neighbors’ influence on the partnered node. Based on the assumption that the more attention 
a node obtains, the more important it is, (Gu, Gong, Lou, & Zhang, 2017), we sum each node’s total 
attention and then rank all VC nodes in descending order. The Graph Attention method takes the 
attention coefficient matrix of each node-pair, a 1,436 times 1,436 matrix, and identifies out the top 
42 VC firms, which we define as industry elites.  
Table 1 shows the average degree, investment frequency, k-shell and betweenness for elites 
and their satellites. Elites have a higher investment frequency and a larger amount of co-investments 
with other VCs in comparison to satellites. Their average k-shell is also high, meaning they have 
more connections with other important players. In addition, these elites’ average betweenness 
centrality is much larger than the followers’, telling us that they act as bridges in the whole network.  
We also compute the density within the elite-clique as well as in each center-satellites group. 
The elite clique has tight within-group interaction, so the density is much higher than average, and 
the EI index (within-group density divided by whole-network density) is as high as 123. This 
indicator shows that the elites cooperate so frequently that they form a small clique at the center of 
the whole industrial network. We then calculate the center-satellites group density around each elite 
and average the results. The average center-satellites group density is also high in comparison to the 
whole network density. The EI index is 25, showing that followers in a center-satellites group tend 
to cooperate with others within a  group, rather than with other  groups’ members.  
From the analyses stated above, we outline network properties that indicate the network 
structure of the Chinese VC industry, i.e. a small-world network with some elites (major players), 
each of whom leads a small group of satellites. These elites are also bridges among center-satellites 
groups and bond together so that an elite-clique emerges at the center of the entire network. Finally, 
we compare these indicators with our models’ predictions to show the models’ explanatory power. 
Table 1 is about here 
Next, we look at the specifications and parameters of the three models. The first model 
integrates relational embeddedness, the idea that frequent syndication partners tend to jointly invest 
in a start-up. The second model, structural embeddedness, adds an additional function to the 
relational embeddedness model: The probability of a VC firm to invite friends of friends to join in 
new investments. We compare the relational and structural embeddedness models with a Random 
Joint Investment model while controlling for network scale, network growth, investment frequency 
and syndication tendency. Below are the specifications and parameters of the three models. 
                                                                    
 As a rough test of the validity of this computing method, we used the Delphi method to identify “elites” in the Chinese VC 
industry. Elites are defined as companies that can find good investment opportunities, play a leading role in investment activities, 
set up investment plans and organize their followers to be syndication partners. In other words, they are center-satellites group 
leaders. We then explained our definition of elites to four experts, including one chairman of a national leading research institute, 
two CEOs of big domestic VCs, and one CEO of a big foreign investor. They eventually provided us with a list of 42 elite VCs, 
and the others are listed as followers of these leaders. We tested the validity of the Graph Attention algorithm with the real VC 
network. It achieved a prediction accuracy of 0.78 and F1 Score = 0.80 in finding the 42 elites. 
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Random Joint Investment Model 
We focus on the changes from 2000 to 2013, so the models simplify each year to a moment of 
t and control network size by setting the evolution iteration t = 14. The growth rate of the number 
of venture capital institutions is taken as a function of time. We then apply the exponential function 
(1) to fit the VC growth rate with the starting number of VCs m1 = 75. The growth function of the 
number of investors is expressed as: 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑓𝐴(𝑚𝑡−1) = 75 × 1.3
𝑡  (1) 
Based on industry experience (Jovanovic, 1982), we give a rough linear estimation formula for 
the target firms (investees), with the starting number of firms n1 = 375. Function 2 shows how 
targeted firms grow as a function of VC firms. 
𝑛𝑡 = 5 × (𝑚𝑡)  (2) 
Different VC firms have different investment frequencies. Large VC firms usually invest 
frequently, while small VC firms tend to have a low investment frequency (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, 
& Yang, 2007), as shown in Fig. 4.  
Fig. 4 is about here 
In order to describe this property and control for network density, we assign a time-invariant 
variable of investment frequency (Fi) to each VC firm. This property defines how many firms a VC 
will invest in each time. We apply a stair-case function to curve the investment frequency property. 
To simplify this property, VC firms are divided into three categories, as shown in Table 2. The first 
third have a low frequency (Fi = 0.26), the other third a middle frequency (Fi = 0.796), and the final 
third have a high frequency (Fi = 5.047). All these statistics are computed from real data. 
Table 2 is about here 
This property is static, which means once a new VC firm is added into the evolution process, 
its investment frequency won’t change in different iterations. Whenever two VC firms randomly 
invest in the same firm, the Random Joint Investment model counts one co-investment between 
them.  
Table 2 shows the control variables for the model and the evolution of network size.  
Relational Embeddedness Model 
Relational embeddedness refers to trust created by repeated cooperation between a pair of VC 
firms. In order to describe this property, we divide evolution process in each time t into two stages: 
random joint investment and inviting cooperation. The first stage is the same as the Random Joint 
Investment model, i.e. VC firms randomly choose target firms. In the second stage, VC firms invite 
frequent syndication partners to co-invest in target firms. 
Fig. 5 is about here 
Different VC firms have different syndication tendencies (Qi), i.e. the number of partners a VC 
will invite in each run of investment. According to the syndication tendency distribution of real data 
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shown in Fig. 5, we classify the syndication tendency of network nodes into three categories--the 
first one-third have a high tendency (Qi = 0.90), the second third is medium (Qi = 0.59) while the 
last one is very low (Qi = 0.20). The syndication tendency characterizes the VC firms’ willingness 
to syndicate. 
Table 3 is about here 
The invitation strategy also differs between syndication partners. VC firms that operate 
according to guanxi-orientated behavioral norms are more likely to syndicate with frequent 
cooperation partners. Table 4 shows that a Chinese VC may invite its closest partners to invest 
jointly 3 times in every 4 investments. It also shows that if two VC firms have partnered together 
many times, then the probability they will invite each other in the next run is higher, and the 
invitation probability grows almost linearly with the number of joint investments. Thus, we measure 
invitation probability by co-investment frequency.  
In this model, we use nij to represent the co-investment frequency between VC i and j and 
invitation probability pi,j is defined as: 
𝑝𝑖,𝑗 = {
0       (no tie between 𝑖 and 𝑗)       
𝑛𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑗𝑗
    (𝑛𝑖,𝑗  is the joint investment times)
 
 
(3) 
 
Table 4 is about here 
In the relational embeddedness model, we control for network size, network growth, 
investment frequency, syndication tendency and invitation probability. As shown in Table 3 and , 
there are nine types of VC nodes in the relational embeddedness model. Fig. 6 shows how a network 
is formed according to this model. 
Fig. 6 is about here 
Structural Embeddedness Model 
Firms can use third-party trust to broaden the scope for new investments. Thus, in the structural 
embeddedness model, we add the probability for VC firms to invite friends of friends to syndicate. 
The only difference between relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness lies in the 
invitation strategy. In the relational embeddedness model, if there is no direct tie between two VC 
nodes, there is no chance for them to invite each other during the second stage in any time stamp. 
But in the structural embeddedness model, whenever two VC firms are linked indirectly by common 
neighbors, as shown in Fig. 7, there is still some probability of invitation. The structural 
embeddedness model also has two stages, random investment and inviting cooperation stages. nij 
denotes the co-invest time. N is the co-invest matrix. We apply M = N * N to denote the second-
order relationship between node pairs. The invitation probability pi,j is defined in Function 4: 
𝑝𝑖,𝑗 = 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑚𝑖,𝑗
max(𝑀)
 (no tie between 𝑖 and 𝑗)        
𝑛𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑗𝑗
   (𝑛𝑖,𝑗 is the syndication frequency)
 
 
(4) 
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Fig. 7 is about here 
Analytical Results 
To measure the predictive power of the three models, we compare the models’ simulation 
results with actual network data. We check macro-level fitness through the distribution of degree, 
cluster coefficient and tie strength. Micro-level fitness is tested by computing the number of various 
types of motifs. 
Testing by Macro-level Distribution 
We selected several macro-level network indicators such as degree distribution, tie-strength 
distribution and clustering-coefficient distribution to compare the Random Joint Investment, 
relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness models with the real industrial network. Fig. 
8, 9 and 10, show that the relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness models are far 
better than the Random Joint Investment model at predicting macro-level indicators computed from 
real data. In addition, the structural embeddedness model does even better than the relational 
embeddedness model. 
Fig. 8, 9, 10 is about here 
Testing by Micro-level Motif 
Here we introduce various types of motifs, which are microscopic indicators in network 
analysis. Motifs are patterns (sub-graphs) that recur within a network much more often than 
expected in a random graph. Finding motifs can not only help us uncover the structure of a complex 
network but also provide a deep insight into its formation mechanisms. In Table 5, we compare the 
number of motifs generated through simulation results with those of the real network. Table 5 shows 
that the structural and relational embeddedness models perform much better than the Random Joint 
Investment model. In the real-world network, structural and relational embeddedness models have 
no quadrangle motifs. This means that if two VC firms have two common neighbors, there will 
definitely be a joint investment between them in the near future. We also find that the structural 
embeddedness model is better than the relational embeddedness model, which proves that inviting 
friends’ friends to participate in joint investments is an important mechanism in the Chinese VC 
industry. 
Table 5 is about here 
The Predictive Power of the Structural Embeddedness Model 
In the final stage, the structural embeddedness model is used to simulate the evolutionary 
process of the Chinese VC industry network, and predict the properties of a small-world network 
with an elite-clique at its center. As shown by the betweenness, degree, elite-clique EI index and 
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average center-satellites groups’ EI index in Table 1, the structural embeddedness model has far 
better predictive power than the Random Joint Investment model. Betweenness and degree 
simulation results show that the leaders of center-satellites groups are also bridges in the whole 
industrial network. The elite-clique EI index is very similar to the statistics computed from real data, 
in that the density within the elite clique is extremely high. The average center-satellites groups’ EI 
index is even higher than that computed from real data, and reveals that the connections within each 
small group are on average much denser than those between groups.  
To evaluate the structural embeddedness model’s predictive power, we compute the eight 
network property indicators mentioned in Table 1 for the whole time frame of our study. We 
compare them with real data in each year by calculating the correlation among these indicators. Fig. 
11 shows that the structural embeddedness model’s correlations with the real network grow during 
network evolution. That means, the small-world network with an elite-clique, in which center-
satellites group leaders play the bridging roles at the same time, gradually forms in the evolution 
process, as shown in the simulation of the structural embeddedness model. 
Fig. 11 is about here 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Exploring the VC Industry Network Structure 
Our paper tries to explore the formation of a small-world industrial network with an elite-clique 
at its center. According to the structural embeddedness model in the VC industry, there is a group 
of major players who often invest together. They seek out followers to join them at the same time. 
These major players invite partner based on a selection principle, which is that frequent syndication 
partners are more likely to be asked to participate in future joint investments, as suggested by 
relational embeddedness theory. In some cases strangers may be invited to participate in joint 
investments. Structural embeddedness theory posits that friends’ friends with a larger number of 
common neighbors are more likely to be invited.  
Fig. 11 shows that as the structural embeddedness model evolves, its correlation with real-
world data increases. In other words, the partner-selection mechanism integrated into the model fits 
the real network well. That means, major players initiate most joint investments, and select familiar 
syndication partners to participate in these investments. Gradually, followers bond together around 
one major player and a center-satellites group forms. Structural embeddedness states that this major 
player also seeks partners outside of its small group, and companies with more common neighbors 
are more likely to be accepted as partners. Other major players have much more connections in the 
industrial network than ordinary VC firms. Therefore, they have more common neighbors with other 
major players, and more chances to become direct cooperation partners. In the long-term, these 
major players build dense ties with each other and an elite-clique emerges at the center of the whole 
network. 
Based on our results we found that the structural embeddedness model is better than the 
relational embeddedness model at predicting real-world data. Both the structural embeddedness and 
relational embeddedness models are much better than the Random Joint Investment model. We 
control for network scale, network growth and investment frequency which, even though they are 
network statistics computed from real data, are not enough to make a good prediction. In the 
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statistical distribution for both macro-level network features and micro-level motif numbers, both 
the embeddedness models have much better prediction results than the base model. Social 
embeddedness theory is the foundation for the relational embeddedness and structural 
embeddedness models. Both relational and structural embeddedness theories are confirmed as 
important factors in network dynamics (Burt, 2010; Gulati, 1999), and in particular in the VC field 
(Powell et al., 2005). That is, existing cooperation has an important impact on new runs of 
cooperation, and neighboring positions in the network structure increase the possibility of becoming 
partners in the future.  
Incorporating these theories into a model is very meaningful. They not only got confirmation 
from the regression analysis, but partner-selection mechanisms can be explored via a network 
dynamics model. Change in a social system is the result of the interplay between social networks 
and behaviors (Granovetter, 1973; Holbrook, 2002; Padgett & Powell, 2012), network dynamics is 
vital for us to understand the evolutionary process of a social system. We find that only building 
existing network statistics into a dynamic model is not enough to predict a real network. Social 
theory can help us explore the operating mechanisms that drive change in a network. 
The Usefulness of VC Network Dynamics 
The Chinese VC industry is a social system with its own network features and dynamics. 
Different kinds of social systems may have various mechanisms that affect network dynamics in 
different ways, so we must carefully examine the behaviors behind these mechanisms. For example, 
why does a Chinese VC firm only choose indirect ties with common neighbors as potential partners? 
How do Chinese VCs work with frequent partners? Are there any theoretical findings which may 
guide us in choosing which model parameters to include? Doing further qualitative studies will help 
answer these questions. Combining qualitative and quantitative studies reveals more about the 
processes that shape a network (Small & Newman, 2001). In future studies, we need to do fieldwork 
to collect qualitative information about how social embeddedness works in the Chinese VC industry. 
For example, we discovered that there is no closed quadrangles in the real network, structural and 
relational embeddedness models. That means, whenever two VC firms have two common neighbors, 
they will become cooperating partners. Why is that? This is a puzzle which deserves our attention 
in the next run of studies, which may help us uncover more mechanisms behind the evolution 
process. 
Like any study, we still have room for improvement. There are many other network factors not 
in this model, such as similarity, the tendency to follow trends (Powell et al., 2005), preferential 
attachment (Barabási, 2005; Barabási & Albert, 1999) and some institutional explanations, e.g. 
norms that discourage satellites from becoming bridges (Xiao & Tsui, 2007). Adding these factors 
into a model will provide us with an even better fit for the actual network. This is especially true in 
different institutional environments; For example, foreign investors and state-owned VCs face 
different institutional environments in China, and have different syndication behaviors (Luo, et, al, 
2018). These two types of VCs are even organized into two comparatively separate communities 
(Wang, Zhou, Tang, & Luo, 2016). How do their networks evolve? Do their network structures have 
significantly different outcomes? Do they have different model parameters? Or, do we need to build 
different models to explain their varying evolutions? These questions pose interesting challenges 
for future studies. 
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Our model sheds light on the Chinese VC industry, but can we generalize it to other industries 
and those in other cultures? This model should have some explanatory power for all industrial 
network that have a similar structure to the one shown in Fig. 1. However, in addition to the 
generalized model, social theories provide useful explanations in certain social contexts. It is good 
to explore the causal mechanisms proposed by social theories qualitatively and quantitatively in 
different social contexts. Mechanisms that gain confirmation can be built into model to simulate the 
evolutionary process of a network. Any inconsistency in the model provides us with clues to 
investigate other mechanisms behind the dynamic process. So, in the next run of studies, new 
theories may be brought in, and a new model can be built. A good starting point would be testing 
the embeddedness model with the data of other industry networks. When compared with different 
cultural or industrial contexts, we may get variation in our model parameters, or even need to modify 
our model. 
This paper is an attempt to explore one particular type of network. More social factors and 
mechanisms need to be introduced in future studies, and more cases that encompass different social 
contexts need to be collected.  
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Fig. 1. An Example Illustrating the Small-World Network: A small-world network with an elite-clique. Elites are 
not only the leaders of center-satellites groups but also bridges among these groups.  
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Fig. 2. The Formation of Syndication Ties: A tie is created between two VC firms when they invest in the same 
target firm at the same time. 
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Fig. 3. Probability of Syndication and Distance 
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Fig. 4. Ranking VC Firms According to Investment Frequency: The X-axis is investment frequency, and the Y-axis 
is the accumulative number of VC firms. A large number of VC firms have a low investment frequency, while only 
few investors’ frequency are high. 
  
17 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Ranking the VC Firms According to their Syndication Tendency. The X-axis is the ratio of syndication times, 
and the Y-axis is the accumulative number of VC firms. 
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Fig. 6. Network Formation in the Relational Embeddedness Model. There are investing and inviting, stages in a time 
stamp. During the investing stage, a VC firm invests in targeted firms randomly according to its investment 
frequency. In the inviting step, this VC invites its syndication partners according to its syndication tendency and 
following the selection mechanism state in Function (3).  
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Fig. 7. Network Formation in the Structural Embeddedness Model: Based on the relational embeddedness Model, 
the selection mechanism is changed to Function (4). 
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Fig. 8. The Comparison of Degree Distribution of Different Models and the Real Network: X-axis is the number of 
nodes, and Y-axis is the log of node degree. 
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Fig. 9. The Comparison of Clustering Coefficient Distribution of Different Models and the Real Network. 
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Fig. 10. The Comparison of Tie Strength Distribution of Different Models and the Real Network 
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Fig. 11. Correlation between the Indicators of Small-World Network with An Elite-Clique: There are 8 indicators 
for both elites and followers in Table 1, and we correlate the models’ indicators with those in the real network. The 
correlation coefficients between the real network and the structural embeddedness are in red dots. The coefficients 
between the real network and Random Joint Investment model are in blue dots.  
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Network Name 
 
Real Network Property 
Structural 
Embeddedness 
Random 
Investment 
nodes category elite follower all 
nodes 
elite follower elite follower 
degree 18.216 3.650 6.440 12.397 2.583 0.765 0.765 
k-shell 12.000 2.330 3.678 7.516 1.018 0.519 0.519 
betweenness 0.014 0.002 0.008 0.019 0 0 0 
investment frequency 47.310 4.090 8.500 75.572 4.450 0.765 0.765 
elite-clique density 0.492 0.003 0.004 0.248 0.001 0 0 
elite-clique EI index 123 0.750 - 124 0.500 0 0 
center-satellites group 
density 
0.100 - - 0.100 - 0.341 - 
center-satellites groups’ 
EI index 
25 - - 50 - 226 - 
 
 
Table 1. The Eight Indicators Illustrating Small-World Network with An Elite-Clique: The Comparison between 
Structural Embeddedness and Stochastic Joint Models and the Real Network. 
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Table 2. The Control variables and the Evolutionary Process in the Random Joint Investment Model. 
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Table 3. The Parameters of Investment Frequency and Syndication Tendency in the Three Models. There are nine 
types of VC nodes with high, middle, low investment frequency and invitation tendency.  
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syndication frequency invitation probability Syndication frequency in total 
1 0.04 27438 
2 0.10 3664 
3 0.15 1068 
4 0.18 434 
5 0.21 212 
6 0.19 84 
7 0.46 26 
8 0.26 38 
9 0.38 16 
10 0.75 4 
 
Table 4. The invitation probability in the next run of investment grows with the syndication (co-invest) frequency. 
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Table 5. The Comparison of the Motif Number among Different Models and the Real Network 
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